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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
Seitz, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal primarily presents an issue that divides 
sister Courts of Appeals and is of first impression in our 
court -- namely, whether the McCarran Ferguson Act, 15 
U.S.C. SS 1011-1015 (1994) ("The Act"), precludes a cause 
of action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. SS 1961-1968 (1994), 
where the challenged predicate acts arise out of the 
defendant's insurance business. The district court exercised 
jurisdiction over plaintiff 's federal claims pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1331 and over supplemental state tort claims 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1367. Our appellate jurisdiction arises 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 to review the district court's final 
orders. 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("MetLife") 
terminated the employment of Richard Sabo as an 
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insurance sales agent in alleged retaliation for his refusal to 
participate in illegal trading activity. Mr. Sabo ("Plaintiff ") 
then sued MetLife and several MetLife employees 
("Antonino", "Sherman", and "Schram") in the district court, 
alleging causes of action under RICO as well as a claim 
based on the common law tort of defamation. In particular, 
the complaint recited the existence of three predicate acts 
under RICO: (1) a "churning" scheme, whereby  MetLife 
encouraged and coerced agents to fraudulently trade 
insurance policies in order to accumulate commissions and 
decrease the value of outstanding policies; (2) a"50/50" 
insurance plan that MetLife fraudulently advertised as a 
retirement savings plan; and (3) an organized poli cy of 
intimidation and harassment by MetLife management 
directed toward its insurance agents to participate in these 
fraudulent activities. 
 
The district court first granted a motion by all defendants 
to dismiss the RICO claims on the ground that the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act precluded such claims where the 
causes of action arose from MetLife's insurance business. 
At the close of discovery, the district court, under a 
summary judgment standard, dismissed the remaining 
defamation action on the ground that the alleged 
defamatory statements were not sufficiently directed toward 
the plaintiff so that a jury could reasonably conclude that 
they referred to him. Plaintiff now appeals these two orders. 
 
II. The McCarran-Ferguson Act 
 
Because the central issue in plaintiff 's RICO claims 
implicates an application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, we 
turn first to that Act. Our standard of reviewing the district 
court's grant of a motion to dismiss is plenary. Chester 
County Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 
F.2d 808, 810-811 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
Section 2 of the Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. S 1012, reads 
as follows: 
 
       Regulation by State law; Federal law relating 
       specifically to insurance; applicability of certain 
       Federal laws after June 30, 1948 
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       (a) State regulation. The business of insuranc e, and 
       every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the 
       laws of the several States which relate to the regulation 
       or taxation of such business. 
 
       (b) Federal regulation. No Act of Congress  shall be 
       construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law 
       enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the 
       business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax 
       upon such business, unless such Act specifically 
       relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That 
       after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as 
       amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of 
       October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton 
       Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the 
       Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be 
       applicable to the business of insurance to the extent 
       that such business is not regulated by State law. 
 
The stated purposes of the Act, as expressed in section 1, 
are to leave regulation and taxation of the insurance 
business to the states and to ensure that "silence on the 
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any 
barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the 
several States." 15 U.S.C. S 1011. 
 
In considering the defendants' motion to dismiss the 
RICO claims, the district court adopted a four-part test 
announced in Wexco Inc. v. IMC, Inc., 820 F.Supp. 194, 198 
(M.D.Pa. 1993) which provides that the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act precludes federal litigation if: 
 
       (1) the federal statute under which the allegedly 
       precluded action is brought ... does not specifically 
       relate to the "business of insurance"; (2)  the 
       complained-of activities constitute the "business of 
       insurance"; (3) the relevant state has enacted laws for 
       the purpose of regulating these complained-of 
       activities; and (4) the application of the federal  statute 
       would, "invalidate, impair[,] or supersede" such laws. 
 
Applying this test, the district court held that RICO does 
not specifically relate to the business of insurance, thus 
satisfying the first element of preclusion. As to the second 
element, the district court found that the plaintiff's 
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complained-of activities did indeed constitute activity within 
the "business of insurance." Although plaintiff's complaint 
alleged fraud and coercion under RICO, the district court 
reasoned that the defendants' "underlying activity" involves 
the "promotion and sale of insurance policies to MetLife 
customers," which is central to the insurance business. 
Next, the district court found that Pennsylvania had 
enacted a comprehensive system of insurance regulation so 
that the third element of the preclusion analysis was met. 
Finally, the district court held that the application of RICO 
in an insurance context would "invalidate, impair, or 
supersede" Pennsylvania's insurance laws. The court 
arrived at this conclusion by comparing the remedial 
provisions of civil RICO (namely treble damages, attorney's 
fees, and costs) with Pennsylvania's insurance laws 
primarily providing for administrative remedies. It thus 
reasoned that all the elements of preclusion under the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act were satisfied which mandated a 
dismissal of the plaintiff's RICO claims. 
 
The parties to this appeal focus their arguments on two 
rulings of the district court. First, they disagree as to the 
scope of the "insurance business" covered by the statute, 
and whether it applies to the conduct alleged in the 
complaint. Plaintiff emphasizes that the alleged predicate 
acts of racketeering activity stem from systematic behavior 
of "coercive and intimidating tactics" and thus cannot be 
construed to embrace the business of insurance. 
Defendants, on the other hand, assert that plaintiff's 
complaint necessarily relates to the insurance business 
because it attacks the heart of the insurance industry -- 
specifically, how MetLife manages the licensing of its 
agents, the agents' authority to solicit insurance, and how 
agents receive commissions. 
 
Second, both sides contest the proper construction of the 
"invalidate, impair, or supersede" phrase in 15 U.S.C. 
S 1012(b) quoted above. Plaintiff urges this court to adopt a 
"direct conflict" test, in which a federal statute would not 
"invalidate, impair, or supersede" a state law unless the 
federal legislation directly conflicts with substantive duties 
governed by state insurance law. Conversely, the 
defendants argue that any analysis of the Act's impairment 
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should not focus on substantive conflict but instead should 
compare the plaintiff's broad federal RICO remedies with 
the exclusively administrative scheme adopted under 
Pennsylvania insurance laws. We will address these two 
arguments in turn. 
 
A. Preclusion Analysis Under the McCarran- 
Ferguson Act 
 
As with any other issue of statutory construction, the 
starting point in the Act's interpretation is the language of 
the statute itself. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug 
Co., 440 U.S. 205, 210 (1979). Section 2(a) of the statute, 
by its terms, affirmatively subjects the business of 
insurance to state regulation. 15 U.S.C. S 1012(a). The 
statute then takes the further step of proscribing 
unintended federal interference of state insurance laws by 
a general mandate that no federal law "shall . . . invalidate, 
impair, or supersede" any state law enacted "for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. 
S 1012(b). This preclusionary mandate does not apply when 
the federal statute in question "specifically relates to the 
business of insurance," in which case normal supremacy 
rules control and the federal statute trumps conflicting 
state law.1 
 
The Supreme Court has extensively reviewed the Act's 
legislative history, see, e.g., United States Dep't of the 
Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1993), Securities 
and Exchange Comm'n v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 
453, 458-59 (1969), and has fully explained the legislative 
intent behind the statute's preclusionary approach to 
federal intrusion on state insurance laws: 
 
       [C]ongress' purpose was broadly to give support to the 
       existing and future state systems for regulating and 
       taxing the business of insurance. This was done in two 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because the plaintiff 's complaint is not grounded in federal antitrust 
laws, we focus our analysis on the first clause of section 1012(b). As the 
Supreme Court noted, the language of the Act distinguishes preclusion 
analysis where antitrust laws are at issue. United States Dep't of the 
Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 504 (1993). 
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       ways. One was by removing obstructions which might 
       be thought to flow from its own power, whether 
       dormant or exercised, except as otherwise provided in 
       the Act itself or in future legislation. The other was by 
       declaring expressly and affirmatively that continued 
       state regulation and taxation of this business is in the 
       public interest and that the business and all who 
       engage in it "shall be subject to" the laws of the several 
       states in these respects. 
 
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-30 
(1946) (footnote omitted); see also Lac D'Amiante du 
Quebec, Ltee v. American Home Assurance Co., 864 F.2d 
1033, 1038-39 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
If it is determined that the alleged conduct at issue 
broadly constitutes the "business of insurance," and is 
therefore subject to state regulation under section 1012(a), 
the next issue is whether the anti-preemption mandate of 
section 1012(b) precludes a federal cause of action. Here, 
the statute makes clear that a party is barred from suing 
under federal law if three distinct requirements are met. 
First, the federal law at issue does not "specifically relate" 
to the business of insurance. Second, the state law 
regulating the challenged conduct was "enacted for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance." Finally, 
an application of federal law would "invalidate, impair, or 
supersede" such state law.2 Fabe, 508 U.S. at 501. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note at the outset that federal courts have seemingly disagreed as 
to the proper analytic inquiry into McCarran-Ferguson Act preclusion. 
See, e.g., Dornberger v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. , 961 F.Supp. 506, 516 
n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Ambrose v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, 
Inc., 
891 F.Supp. 1153, 1158 n.4 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff'd, 95 F.3d 41 (4th Cir. 
1997) (unpublished per curiam). Some courts draw upon a four-part 
inquiry similar to that used by district court and the Wexco court. See 
Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., 92 F.3d 384, 391-92 (6th Cir. 1996); 
American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 84 F.3d 834, 838-43 (7th Cir. 1996); 
Merchants Home Delivery Service, Inc. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 50 F.3d 
1486, 1489 (9th Cir. 1995); Cochran v. Paco, Inc. 606 F.2d 460, 464 (5th 
Cir. 1979). Other courts have announced a more truncated three-part 
test that does not require a specific conclusion that the defendant's 
conduct constitutes the business of insurance. See Doe v. Norwest Bank 
Minn., 107 F.3d 1297, 1305 n.8 (8th Cir. 1997); United States. v. Rhode 
Island Insurers' Insolvency Fund, 80 F.3d 616, 619 (1st Cir. 1996). 
Because of this apparent divergence, it is important to discuss our 
analysis in detail. 
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The threshold question in determining whether the anti- 
preemption mandate of 15 U.S.C. S 1012(b) applies is 
whether the challenged conduct broadly constitutes the 
"business of insurance" in the first place. 15 U.S.C. 
S 1012(a). If the contested activities are wholly unrelated to 
the insurance business, then the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
has no place in analyzing federal regulation because only 
when "[insurance companies] are engaged in the `business 
of insurance' does the act apply." National Securities, 393 
U.S. at 459-60. 
 
In addressing the issue of preclusion under S 1012(b), we 
read no more into the statute than what it says: unless a 
federal law specifically relates to the business of insurance, 
it will not be applied when it "invalidates, impairs, or 
supersedes" a state law "enacted for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance." If the defendant's 
conduct does not constitute "the business of insurance," 
then the Act simply does not apply and there is no need to 
confront preclusion issues under S 1012(b). We cannot 
imagine how section 1012(b) protects a state law enacted 
for the purpose of regulating the insurance business when 
the activity in question does not relate to insurance. To 
hold otherwise would require us to abandon the structure 
and purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 
 
Our reading of the Act is amply supported by its 
legislative history and Supreme Court precedent. As 
explained by the Supreme Court: 
 
       The statute did not purport to make the States 
       supreme in regulating all the activities of insurance 
       companies; its language refers not to the persons or 
       companies who are subject to state regulation, but to 
       laws "regulating the business of insurance." Insurance 
       companies may do many things which are subject to 
       paramount federal regulation; only when they are 
       engaged in the "business of insurance" does the statute 
       apply. Certainly the fixing of rates is part of this 
       business. . . . The selling and advertising of policies, 
       and the licensing of companies and their agents are 
       also within the scope of the statute. Congress was 
       concerned with the type of state regulation that centers 
       around the contract of insurance, the transaction 
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       which [the Court has previously held] was not 
       "commerce." The relationship between insurer and 
       insured, the type of policy which could be issued, its 
       reliability, interpretation, and enforcement--these were 
       the core of the "business of insurance." Undoubtedly, 
       other activities of insurance companies relate so closely 
       to their status as reliable insurers that they too must 
       be placed in the same class. But whatever the exact 
       scope of the statutory term, it is clear where the focus 
       was--it was on the relationship between the insurance 
       company and the policyholder. Statutes aimed at 
       protecting or regulating this relationship, directly or 
       indirectly are laws regulating the "business of 
       insurance." 
 
National Securities, 393 U.S. at 459-60 (citations omitted). 
Thus, under S 1012(a), the Act initially recognizes that 
regulating the "business of insurance" rests in the hands of 
the states. 
 
Of these state "laws relat[ing] to the regulation or 
taxation" of the insurance business, 15 U.S.C. S 1012(a), 
the next subsection protects from federal preemption a 
special class of state laws "enacted . . . for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. S 1012(b). 
But as explained by the Supreme Court, the categories of 
laws protected by S 1012(b) "necessarily encompasses more 
than just the `business of insurance' " and include those 
laws that possess the " `end, intention, or aim' of adjusting, 
managing, or controlling the business of insurance." Fabe, 
508 U.S. at 505 (citation omitted). The focus of section 
1012(b) is not directed toward the business of insurance 
itself, but rather toward a certain subset of laws relating to 
insurance regulation under section 1012(a). That 
demarcation line is found in S 1012(b) as laws "enacted . . . 
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance." 
Thus, even though the state has a law regulating the 
challenged activity, a court must still address whether that 
law was meant to fall within the ambit of the Act's 
protection. This is achieved by deciding whether the activity 
in question constitutes the business of insurance and 
whether the specific state law was enacted with the " `end, 
intention, or aim' of adjusting, managing, or controlling the 
business of insurance." Fabe, 508 U.S. at 505. 
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B. Application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
 
We first ask whether the challenged activity alleged in the 
complaint constitutes the "business of insurance" in order 
to determine whether the Act applies. The Supreme Court 
has provided guidance as to what conduct falls within 
"business of insurance" for purposes of the McCarran- 
Ferguson Act. In National Securities, the Court held that the 
core of the insurance business "centers around the contract 
of insurance." 393 U.S. at 460. The Court further set forth 
typical activity that would unquestionably constitute the 
business of insurance: "[t]he relationship between insurer 
and insured, the type of policy which could be issued, its 
reliability, interpretation, and enforcement." Id. 
 
Similarly, in Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug 
Co., the Supreme Court formulated a three part inquiry in 
interpreting the phrase "business of insurance": 
(1) whether the practice has the effect of transfe rring or 
spreading a policyholder's risk; (2) whether the p ractice is 
an integral part of the policy relationship between the 
insurer and the insured; and (3) whether the pract ice is 
limited to entities within the insurance industry. 440 U.S. 
205, 211-21 (1979); see also Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. 
Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982). While this inquiry was 
directed to the antitrust clause in section 1012(b), it may 
nevertheless provide guidance in a more generalized 
analysis under this Act. See Fabe, 508 U.S. 503-504.3 
 
In this case, we agree with MetLife and its named 
employees that their activity constitutes the business of 
insurance. The challenged conduct appearing in the 
plaintiff 's complaint unquestionably centers around the 
insurance contract, and specifically the activities 
surrounding its sale and marketing. MetLife's "50/50 plan," 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Some courts have concluded that this three part test is simply not 
relevant in determining what constitutes the business of insurance in a 
non-antitrust context. See, e.g., Doe, 107 F.3d at 1305 n.8. We disagree. 
As Fabe makes clear, the Royal Drug test is only a starting point in the 
analysis for non-antitrust cases. 508 U.S. at 503-5. However, because 
laws "enacted . . . for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance" necessarily encompass more than just the insurance 
business, the analysis here is broader. 
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"churning" trades, and management's organized 
intimidation of sales agents, all strike at the insurance 
business "core" enumerated in National Securities because 
they directly impact on the sale of insurance policies and 
ultimately affect the relationship between insurer and 
insured. 393 U.S. at 460. Indeed, whatever the precise 
contours of the insurance business phrase may be, there is 
nothing more basically "insurance" than the sale of an 
insurance contract and the insurer's unique approach in 
trading, advertising, or valuing that product. We need not 
delve into a sophisticated three part analysis under Royal 
Drug or Pireno to reach this conclusion, but instead look to 
the defendants' conduct to ascertain whether it centers 
around the contract of insurance and the relationship 
between insurer and insured. 
 
Plaintiff's assertion that the challenged activity cannot 
constitute the business of insurance because it is illegal is 
unpersuasive. By pointing to a practice that may violate 
federal law, and claiming that it is not the "business of 
insurance," plaintiff demonstrates a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the Act. The language and purpose of 
the Act speak not of legal insurance transactions, but 
instead seek to allow states to regulate and enforce the 
insurance business without fear of unintended federal 
interference. We agree with the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit that if we were to construe the "business of 
insurance" phrase by reference to federal legality, the 
statute would be read out of existence. Merchants, 50 F.3d 
at 1490. As noted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
"it is not helpful to point to a practice forbidden by federal 
law . . . and observe that this practice is not itself 
insurance." NAACP v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 
F.2d 287, 294 (7th Cir. 1992). It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the majority of courts have rejected this 
same argument advanced here by the plaintiff, and so do 
we. See Dornberger, 961 F.Supp. at 517 (surveying cases). 
 
C. Preclusion of RICO Claims Under the McCarran- 
Ferguson Act 
 
Having found that the activity challenged in the 
complaint constitutes the business of insurance, and is 
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therefore within the ambit of the Act, we consider whether 
plaintiff 's RICO cause of action is precluded under 
S 1012(b). No party to the appeal argues that RICO 
specifically relates to insurance. Indeed, virtually every 
court considering this issue has held that RICO is not a 
federal statute exempt from the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 
See, e.g., Kenty, 92 F.3d at 391; Merchants, 50 F.3d at 
1489; Dornberger, 961 F.Supp. at 516. Nor is it disputed 
that the applicable Pennsylvania insurance statute is a 
state law enacted for the purpose of regulating the 
insurance business. Thus, all that is left for us to consider 
under the Act is whether an application of RICO to the 
instant case would "invalidate, impair, or supersede" state 
law. 
 
1. Pennsylvania Insurance Laws and RICO 
 
In order to determine whether a cause of action under 
RICO would "invalidate, impair, or supersede" Pennsylvania 
insurance law, we must initially juxtapose RICO with a 
specific state law enacted for the purpose of regulating the 
insurance business. The district court, along with both 
sides on appeal, point to Pennsylvania's Unfair Insurance 
Practices Act, 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 1171.1 to 1171.15 
(West 1992) ("UIPA"), as the relevant state law governing 
MetLife's challenged activity. The Act prohibits persons 
from engaging in unfair or deceptive practices in the 
business of insurance. Id. S 1171.4. An exhaustive list of 
activity is set forth in section 1171.5 as deceptive or unfair 
practices forbidden under section 1171.4. The UIPA further 
empowers the Pennsylvania insurance commissioner to 
investigate illegal insurance practices and to take certain 
remedial actions including the imposition of monetary 
penalties, "cease and desist" orders, the suspension or 
revocation of an insurance license, or additional injunctive 
relief. Id. SS 1171.7 to 1171.11. 
 
By judicial precedent, the Pennsylvania Insurance 
Commissioner alone may seek to enforce the UIPA. See 
Wright v. North Am. Life Assurance Co., 372 Pa. Super. 272, 
279, 539 A.2d 434, 438 (1988) ("[T]he provisions of this 
statute were not intended to confer a right of private action. 
Rather, the Unfair Insurance Practices Act vests 
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enforcement powers in the Pennsylvania Insurance 
 539<!>Commissioner."); Wexco, 820 F.Supp. at 203-204. 
 
Pennsylvania courts, however, have not barred common law 
actions for fraud and deceit arising out of insurance 
practices even though the UIPA does not allow private 
causes of action. Wright, 372 Pa. Super. at 279, 539 A.2d 
at 438. These private lawsuits, in addition to other private 
actions authorized by Pennsylvania law,4  provide the only 
judicial remedies available to plaintiffs victimized by illegal 
insurance practices. 
 
RICO, on the other hand, grants a private cause of action 
to any person injured as a result of a pattern of 
racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. S 1964(c). The statute also 
authorizes the award of treble damages, attorney's fees, and 
costs. Id. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 1961(2), a pattern of 
racketeering activity is defined as at least two acts of illegal 
activity identified in section 1961(1) and includes both mail 
fraud and wire fraud. Beyond the general classes of crimes 
enumerated in section 1961(1), RICO does not specifically 
address insurance practices. 
 
2. "Invalidate, Impair, or Supersede" 
 
Given this comparison of RICO with the UIPA, the legal 
question before us is whether allowing plaintiff 's suit under 
RICO would "invalidate, impair, or supersede" Pennsylvania 
law as that phrase is understood under the Act. The phrase 
"invalidate, impair, or supersede" is not defined anywhere 
in the Act and we are faced with the considerable task of 
grappling with its construction in the present context. 
 
Courts of Appeals jurisprudence is in disarray as to the 
extent and meaning of invalidate, impair, or supersede 
under the Act. One line of cases, spearheaded by thefirst, 
seventh, and ninth circuit Courts of Appeals, looks to a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In addition to common law fraud and deceit, Pennsylvania courts have 
sanctioned the use of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 201-1 to 201-9.2 
(West 1993), to allow aggrieved insureds recovery against insurance 
fraud. See Pekular v. Eich, 355 Pa. Super. 276, 285-90, 513 A.2d 427, 
432-41 (1986). 
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direct conflict in the substantive provisions of the federal 
and state statutes at issue. See Merchants Home Delivery 
Service, Inc. v. Frank B. & Hall Co., 50 F.3d 1486, 1491-92 
(9th Cir. 1995); NAACP v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
978 F.2d 287, 295-97 (7th Cir. 1992); Villafane-Neriz v. 
FDIC, 75 F.3d 727, 736 (1st Cir. 1996). These courts 
typically reason that the Act is a form of inverse preemption 
where federal laws must yield to state laws when the state 
enacts a statute for the purpose of regulating the insurance 
business and the federal statute does not specifically apply 
to insurance. Logic then drawn from ordinary rules of 
federal preemption under the supremacy clause is reversed 
so that a state law will not preempt a federal law unless the 
laws of both sovereigns directly conflict in terms of 
governing the behavior of insurance carriers. See American 
Family, 978 F.2d at 296 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984)). The Act's preemption is 
appropriate, these courts will conclude, where it is simply 
not possible for the insurance carrier to comply with both 
state and federal law. However, because "duplication is not 
conflict," differences in state remedies and federal remedies 
could not be the basis of preemption when both statutes 
proscribe the same insurance practices. Id. 
 
In further support for the foregoing analysis, these courts 
reason that the Act was not intended to cede the entire field 
of insurance regulation to the states. Where a state law or 
regulation is silent as to remedy, or does not provide a 
private cause of action, federal regulation will not be 
preempted. Merchants, 50 F.3d 1492. A contrary 
interpretation of the statute, these courts will conclude, 
would essentially rewrite the Act to read: No federal statute 
shall be construed to apply to the business of insurance, 
unless such federal statute specifically relates to the 
business of insurance. The Congress did not so provide and 
therefore state silence surrounding the assurance of a 
private remedy does not provide the basis for federal 
preemption. Id. 
 
The fourth, eighth, and to a certain extent the sixth, 
circuit Courts of Appeals disagree. When state insurance 
laws provide for enforcement through an administrative 
process to the exclusion of private damage actions, treble 
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damages, attorney's fees, and costs, these courts reason 
that RICO's expanded remedial framework cannot coexist 
with state law based on a plain meaning of the words 
"invalidate," "impair," and "supersede."5 See Doe v. Norwest 
Bank Minn., 107 F.3d 1297, 1307 (8th Cir. 1997); Ambrose 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, Inc., 891 F.Supp. 
1153, 1165 (E.D.Va. 1995), aff'd, 95 F.3d 41 (4th Cir. 
1997) (unpublished per curiam). They say the Act was 
designed to allow state legislatures to adopt their own 
regulatory framework governing how insurance grievances 
are redressed. If a state chose a private forum for redress 
through administrative enforcement, then the Act would 
protect such a decision and federal law would not be 
allowed to upset this balance. Thus, they conclude that the 
drastic nature of federal remedies is directly relevant to 
assessing the application of the "invalidate, impair, or 
supersede" phrase in the Act. See Doe, 107 F.3d at 1307; 
Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., 92 F.3d 384, 392 (6th 
cir. 1996). 
 
To be sure, a direct conflict in the substantive provisions 
of RICO with those provided for in the UIPA would fall 
within the ambit of laws that invalidate, impair, or 
supersede state insurance law. If, for example, 
Pennsylvania explicitly authorizes certain insurance 
practices that RICO would clearly prohibit, the McCarran- 
Ferguson Act would eviscerate the federal cause of action. 
Cf. American Family, 978 F.2d at 297 ("If Wisconsin wants 
to authorize redlining, it need only say so; if it does, any 
challenge to that practice under the auspices of the Fair 
Housing Act becomes untenable."). This would be the case 
no matter how the phrase "invalidate, impair, or supersede" 
is to be construed, as we cannot imagine any more 
impairment then an absolute contradiction in legalfiat 
concerning insurance practices. But we cannot find any 
such conflict in the UIPA when compared to RICO, at least 
in the present context. Consequently, the more critical 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. "Invalidate" is defined as "to weaken or make valueless"; "impair" 
means to "make worse . . . diminish in quantity, value, excellence or 
strength"; "supersede" means to "make obsolete, inferior, or outmoded". 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1199, 1131, 2295 (1986). 
See Ambrose, 891 F.Supp. at 1165. 
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issue is whether we may look to divergent state and federal 
implementation of similar legal norms. 
 
Part of this puzzle has been answered by the Supreme 
Court in National Securities. There, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission sought to unwind a merger between 
two insurance companies based on violations of Rule 
10b-5. The merger had already been approved by the 
Arizona State Director of Insurance in his capacity as 
licensor of insurers within the state. This approval was 
predicated upon a finding that the merger would not 
"substantially reduce the security of and service to be 
rendered to policyholders." 393 U.S. at 462 (quoting Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. S 20-731(B)(3) (1969)). 
 
Upon the foregoing factual scenario, the Supreme Court 
phrased the issue as whether the "McCarran-Ferguson Act 
bars a federal remedy which affects a matter subject to 
state insurance regulation." Id. The Court reasoned that 
any "impairment" in the case would be indirect--the federal 
government sought to protect security holders while the 
Arizona sought to safeguard insurance policy holders. Id. at 
463. 
 
Moreover, the Court noted that there was no true 
"conflict" in remedies at all because "Arizona has not 
commanded something which the Federal Government 
seeks to prohibit." Id. at 463. The Court also found that the 
paramount federal interest in prohibiting securities fraud 
was perfectly compatible with the state interest in 
protecting policyholders. Thus, because of the nature of the 
indirect impairment, and because "the remedy the 
Commission seeks does not affect a matter predominantly 
of concern to policyholders alone," the Court held that it 
saw no reason to emasculate securities laws through an 
application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In the end, the 
Supreme Court "simply [could] not see the conflict" and 
allowed the federal government to unwind the merger 
notwithstanding Arizona's explicit approval. Id.  
 
We too cannot see the conflict in this case andfind no 
invalidation, impairment, or supersedence, however 
defined, of Pennsylvania insurance law. The federal policies 
embodied in RICO, namely, the grant of a liberal federal 
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remedy to those who have been victimized by organized 
crime, see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 487 
(1985), are in no way inconsistent with the stated purpose 
of the UIPA, which is to "regulate trade practices in the 
business of insurance . . . by defining . . . such practices . . . 
which constitute unfair methods of competition or unfair or 
deceptive acts . . . ." 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1171.2; see 
also D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 
494 Pa. 501, 508, 431 A.2d 966, 970 (1981) (stating that 
the UIPA serves to deter bad faith conduct in the insurance 
business). Borrowing from the Supreme Court's analysis in 
National Securities, the RICO remedy does not exclusively 
affect matters predominantly of concern to those protected 
only by the UIPA. 393 U.S. at 463. RICO, whether in effect 
or purpose, is not an attempt to regulate the "sphere 
reserved primarily to the States by the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act." Id. 
 
Of course, this court would be remiss not to recognize 
MetLife's argument that an application of RICO may affect, 
in a more abstract sense, Pennsylvania's overall 
implementation of insurance norms and its decision to 
enforce certain insurance violations in an administrative 
context. As acknowledged by the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit: 
 
       Undoubtedly there is a sense in which any overlap 
       between state and federal law upsets a balance struck 
       by one of the two legislatures. . . . Laws enforced only 
       be administrative agencies with limited budgets are less 
       potent than laws enforced by both agencies and private 
       litigants. One could say that a federal rule increasing 
       the probability that a state norm will be vindicated (or 
       augmenting the damages assessed in the event of a 
       violation) conflicts with a decision by the state that 
       remedies should be limited or rare. 
 
American Family, 978 F.2d at 295 (citations omitted). While 
such an argument may be compelling, there is no place for 
it in the present context. We find no indication, through 
legislative intent or judicial interpretation, that 
Pennsylvania's non-recognition of a private remedy under 
the UIPA represents a reasoned state policy of exclusive 
administrative enforcement or that the vindication of UIPA 
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norms should be limited or rare. Private actions for fraud 
and deceit in the insurance business coexist with the UIPA 
even though the same conduct may be covered by both the 
common law and the UIPA. See, e.g., 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. SS 1171.5(1) to 1171.5(3) (generally prohibiting "false", 
"misleading" or misrepresentative statements and 
omissions). In addition, Pennsylvania courts have held that 
the state's general consumer protection statute, 73 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 201-1 to 201-9.2, provides a private 
remedy and treble damages for victims of insurance fraud. 
See Peckular, 355 Pa. Super. at 285-90, 512 A.2d at 
430-41. This certainly undercuts any purported balance 
struck by the Pennsylvania legislature favoring 
administrative enforcement to the exclusion of private 
damages actions and we see no reason why a federal 
private right of action cannot coexist with the UIPA in these 
circumstances. 
 
We therefore conclude that a RICO cause of action and 
remedy would not "invalidate, impair, or supersede" 
Pennsylvania's scheme of insurance regulation in this 
context. Because we need not reach the issue here, we will 
leave for another day the question of whether different 
federal and state remedies could ever be the basis for 
preclusion under the Act. Accordingly, the district court's 
dismissal of the plaintiff 's RICO claims for failure to state 
a claim will be reversed to the extent it relied on the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act as a basis for preclusion. We will 
also reverse the district court's denial of the motion to 
amend the complaint since the amendment would no longer 
be futile under our application of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act. In so doing, however, we express no opinion as to 
whether the plaintiff has stated proper claims under RICO 
law itself. 
 
III. The Defamation Claim 
 
The plaintiff 's complaint also included a defamation 
claim against MetLife alone based on Pennsylvania law. In 
due course, MetLife filed a motion for summary judgment 
on such a claim which was granted. We will review 
plaintiff 's appeal of this order under a summary judgment 
standard. The district court's grant of summary judgement 
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will be affirmed if, after a plenary review of the record, there 
is no genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
This court will not weigh the evidence in the record itself, 
but instead determine whether there is a genuine issue for 
trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 447 U.S. 242, 247 
(1986); Petruzzi's IGA v. Darling-Delaware, 998 F.2d 1224, 
1230 (3d Cir. 1993). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 
 
Plaintiff's defamation claim arises out of the following 
circumstances as set forth in the affidavit of Fred Newstrom 
("Newstrom"), a sales agent for MetLife who worked with 
plaintiff at one time. The affidavit is based on personal 
knowledge, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
 
About August 23, 1993, MetLife convened a meeting of its 
sales agents in the Pittsburgh region. Several hundred 
agents were in attendance, including Newstrom. There were 
various speakers, including Gary Antonino ("Antonino"), 
Pittsburgh Regional Manager, and Robert Crimmons, 
MetLife Executive Vice President for Personal Insurance. 
Other senior managers of MetLife were also on the dais. 
 
During the course of an address given to the agents by 
Antonino, a brief clip from the movie Ghostbusters was 
shown. In the clip, an animated ghost figure known to 
those familiar with the movie as "slimer" charges down a 
long hallway and attacks one of the other characters. 
"Slimer" is a short, fat, malformed green ghost who attacks 
his victims by covering them with a slimy or gooey material. 
 
Immediately following the showing of the movie clip, 
Antonino made statements to the audience about the way 
the media were portraying MetLife. 
 
The affidavit then goes on: 
 
       At or about the time of this meeting at the Royce 
       Hotel, MetLife was the subject of an ongoing 
       investigative report on the Channel 11 news, in which 
       statements were made that MetLife was under 
       investigation by the Pennsylvania Insurance 
       Department for illegal deceptive sales and trade 
       practices. 
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       Also during this time period, Antonino was letting it 
       be known through the region that he "had it in" for 
       Sabo, and that Sabo was at fault for all of MetLife's 
       difficulties. 
 
       Based upon the showing of the movie clip and the 
       statements made by Antonino immediately thereafter, 
       Herrmann understood Antonino to be saying that it was 
       Sabo [plaintiff] who was spreading false information to 
       the media, and that Sabo was attempting to wrongfully 
       bring about the demise of MetLife. 
 
App. at 487 (alteration in original). After the meeting, other 
MetLife agents who attended the meeting informed 
Newstrom that they also believed that Antonino's message 
was that Sabo was responsible for the information about 
MetLife in the media. Id. 
 
In addition to the affidavit of Newstrom, an affidavit by 
agent Ronald Herrmann was filed. It also was based on 
personal knowledge. In it he recited that he also attended 
the meeting and that he also understood Sabo to be Slimer 
and the evil presence at MetLife. However, Herrmann did 
not state that Antonino "had it in" for the plaintiff. 
 
A copy of the Report and Recommendation of the 
Magistrate Judge who heard the matter recommended to 
the district court that summary judgment be granted to 
MetLife on the defamation claim based solely on the ground 
that there was no support in the record for a finding that 
plaintiff was the intended target of any comments made 
during the "Ghostbuster" presentation. Thereafter, the 
district court granted MetLife's motion for summary 
judgment on the defamation claim solely on the ground 
recommended by the Magistrate Judge. 
 
We note at the outset of this appeal that in an action for 
defamation under Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proving: (1) the defamatory character of  the 
communications; (2) its publication by the defenda nt; 
(3) its application to the plaintiff; (4) the u nderstanding by 
the recipient of its defamatory meaning; (5) under standing 
by the recipient of it as intended to be applied to the 
plaintiff; (6) special harm resulting to the plain tiff from its 
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publication; and (7) abuse of a conditionally priv ileged 
occasion. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8343(a). 
 
We analyze the record keeping in mind that we are 
reviewing summary judgment and that the sole basis for 
granting the motion in the district court was the absence of 
evidence to meet this fifth requirement of the Pennsylvania 
statute, viz., understanding by the recipients of it that it 
was intended to be applied to plaintiff. 
 
Plaintiff concedes that the alleged defamatory matter, 
standing on its own, is insufficient to support a jury finding 
that it refers to him. However, he argues that the 
defamation analysis must nevertheless proceed as to the 
fifth element if the defamatory statements may point to the 
defamed through "description or circumstances tending to 
identify him." Cosgrove Studio & Camera Shop, Inc. v. Pane, 
408 Pa. 314, 319, 182 A.2d 751, 753 (1962). We turn to 
that contention. 
 
Taking the recited contents of the affidavits as true, we 
think it reasonable to infer at this point that the affiants 
were aware at the time of the meeting of rumors with 
respect to MetLife's controversy with the plaintiff. When 
this circumstance is combined with the contents of the 
movie clip and Antonino's remarks thereafter, a genuine 
issue of material fact was created with respect to the fifth 
requirement of the Pennsylvania statute. Consequently, the 
resolution of that factual issue was for the finder of fact. 
Thus, summary judgment should not have been granted 
based on a failure to meet this requirement. 
 
But our conclusion that the district court erred in its 
ruling on the foregoing issue does not end the matter. We 
cannot tell from the record whether MetLife asserted 
grounds other than a failure to meet the fifth element of the 
Pennsylvania statute in support of its summary judgment 
motion. Thus, we conclude that our reversal of the order 
granting summary judgment must be without prejudice to 
the district court's right to consider other asserted grounds 
for summary judgment, if any, that are still before it. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The order of the district court dismissing plaintiff 's RICO 
claim will be reversed, and the order denying plaintiff 's 
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motion to amend the complaint will be vacated. The order 
of the district court granting MetLife's motion for summary 
judgment on plaintiff's defamation claim will be reversed to 
the extent it was based on the ground relied on by the 
district court. It is further ordered that this ruling is 
without prejudice to a consideration by the district court of 
other asserted grounds, if any, for summary judgment. 
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